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Abstract 
 Modern criminal investigators face an increasing number of computer-related 
crimes that require the application of digital forensic science. The major challenge facing 
digital forensics practitioners is the complicated task of acquiring an understanding of the 
digital data residing in electronic devices. Currently, this task requires significant 
experience and background to correctly aggregate the data their tools provide from the 
digital artifacts. Most of the tools available present their results in text files or tree lists. It 
is up to the practitioner to mentally capture a global understanding of the state of the 
device at the time of seizure and find the items of evidentiary interest. This research 
focuses on the application of Information Visualization techniques to improve the 
analysis of digital forensic evidence from Microsoft Windows memory captures. The 
visualization tool developed in this work presents both global and local views of the 
evidence based on user interactions with the graphics. The resulting visualizations 
provide the necessary details for verifying digital artifacts and assists in locating 
additional items of relevance. This proof-of-concept model can be modified to support 
various digital forensic target platforms including Mac OS X, Linux, and Android. 
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WINDOWS MEMORY FORENSIC DATA VISUALIZATION 
 
I. Introduction 
Criminal investigations in the modern era frequently involve digital forensic 
science to analyze potential digital evidence obtained from electronic devices. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) regularly investigates offenses such as Computer 
and Network Intrusions, Identity Theft, as well as cases involving Child Pornography 
(FBI, 2014). As computer technology advances, devices continue to increase their storage 
capacity and processing power effectively enlarging digital forensic evidence collections. 
Research by Beebe and Clark (2005) calls for improvement to the digital investigation 
process citing the rising temporal factor associated with digital evidence analysis. Data 
mining techniques involving predictive modeling and content retrieval are discussed as 
potential enhancements to the analysis process. Data mining employs methods from 
various fields including artificial intelligence, machine learning, pattern recognition, and 
data visualization (Beebe & Clark, 2005). 
The applied science of Information Visualization offers unique solutions for 
gaining an intuitive understanding of large and complex datasets. Information 
Visualization (InfoVis) methods have led to innovative problem solving in numerous 
fields including medicine (Faisal, et al, 2013), business, and computer science (Liu, et al, 
2014). Such methods could provide a fresh approach for Digital Forensic Analysts 
tackling the complexity of understanding large datasets. 
Keim (2002) points out the significance of involving human interaction in the data 
exploration process by blending “the flexibility, creativity, and general knowledge of the 
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human with the enormous storage capacity and the computational power of today’s 
computers.” An advantage to employing a visual approach to analysis lies in the fact that 
exploration is instinctive. The human user (analyst) does not need to grasp complex 
mathematical or statistical concepts to successfully locate data of interest (Keim, 2002). 
1.1 Problem Overview 
The constant increase in electronic device storage capacity results in greater 
workloads for forensic analysts which expands the target space containing relevant digital 
evidence. Consequently the time required to properly analyze the collected data, identify 
relevant digital artifacts, and extract digital evidence increases exponentially. In 
summary, investigators face an uphill battle due to the substantial increase in the size of 
individual digital forensic data collections. The added complexity increases the time 
required to complete forensic analysis using traditional methods.  
Although the majority of investigatory efforts focus on the data in disk storage, 
information recovered from volatile memory can provide unique insight into the state of 
the device at the time of acquisition (Cai, et al, 2013). Data regarding open ports and 
sockets provides an examiner with the state of network communications on the target 
system. The listing of open file handles and system registry keys relates the various 
resources in disk storage accessed by each system process. Knowledge of the resources 
associated with a particular process can assist in identifying key data being exfiltrated by 
malware on an infected system. 
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1.2 Research Motivation 
 The motivation behind this research stems from the growing need to develop 
innovative methods to aid in digital forensic analysis. One proposed method involves the 
application of Information Visualization techniques to provide a unique perspective on 
collection datasets (Osborne, 2012). According to Osborne, InfoVis tools have the 
potential to “aid in the discovery of new pieces of information, decision-making based on 
data, and to provide explanation of certain phenomena existent within the data set.” 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The overall goal of this research is to develop a proof-of-concept interactive 
visualization for analysis of forensic memory images. Shneiderman (1996) outlines seven 
tasks for developing Information Visualization tools listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Seven Tasks for Information Visualization (Shneiderman, 1996). 
Task Description 
Overview Gain an overview of the entire collection. 
Zoom Zoom in on items of interest. 
Filter Filter out uninteresting items. 
Details-on-Demand Select an item or group and get details when needed. 
Relate View relationships among items. 
History 
Keep a history of actions to support undo, replay, and progressive 
refinement. 
Extract Allow extraction of sub-collections and of the query parameters. 
 
The specific objectives for this research are derived from this list and outlined as follows: 
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1. The visualization tool should provide an interactive global view of the data 
output from forensic memory image analysis tools. 
2. The visualization tool should have the ability to filter the datasets for a 
particular system and visually represent the following associations: 
 The relationship between each process and its associated resources. 
 The relationship between a system resource and its associated 
processes. 
3. The visualization tool should assist the user in locating unique patterns and 
information of relevance within the datasets. 
1.4 Methodology 
Chapter 3 presents the process for obtaining forensic memory captures from 
Windows machines and the methodology for extracting digital artifacts from forensic 
memory captures. The two types of malware implemented on the test machines are 
discussed on a behavioral level. The second part of the chapter presents a functional 
overview of the developed visualization tool interface. The basic features of the software 
are discussed which include the global system view and the local view of the system 
which is obtained through user interactions. The last feature of the visualization tool 
involves the addition of visual links to connect resources and associated processes to 
assist the user in locating unique patterns and information of significance within the 
digital forensic dataset. 
Chapter 4 describes the application of the developed visualization tool to eight 
test datasets acquired from Windows XP forensic memory images. The images include 
 
5 
five trusted images and three images infected with a form of malware. The visual results 
from each of the datasets are analyzed and evaluated against the research objectives to 
verify whether each of the three goals is successfully met. 
1.5 Research Implications 
This thesis study is unique because there has been very little published regarding 
the application of Information Visualization techniques to Digital Forensic Analysis, 
particularly in the sub-field of Memory Forensics. The visualization tool developed 
through this research is shown to provide a level of assistance in the recognition of 
existing patterns and the discovery of significant items within the test datasets. 
Visualization could lead to an entirely fresh approach for Digital Forensic Investigations 
by empowering digital forensic practitioners with the ability to quickly perform analysis 
and gain an intuitive understanding of the target system at the time of seizure. 
1.6 Summary 
 This chapter discusses the challenges facing digital forensic investigators 
concerning the rising time frames required to analyze collection datasets that continue to 
grow in size and complexity. The problem overview is stated including the importance of 
volatile memory analysis. The research motivation describes the need to develop 
innovative methods to assist investigators in the digital forensic analysis process. An 
Information Visualization approach is selected as a means of improving the digital 
forensic process. Three specific objectives for the research are listed and a basic 
methodology is outlined. 
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Chapter 2 provides an overview of the digital forensic investigation process and 
introduces the subfield of Forensic Memory Analysis. The chapter also presents the 
significance of memory analysis, image acquisition methods, and memory analysis tools. 
The subject of Information Visualization is explored as a possible solution for 
overcoming digital forensic challenges and available InfoVis tools are discussed. 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology for obtaining forensic memory captures from 
Windows RAM images and the process for extracting digital artifacts using available 
open-source tools. The chapter also provides a functional overview of the visualization 
tool interface developed in this research. Chapter 4 performs analysis using the 
visualization tool on eight test datasets obtained from Windows XP Random-Access 
Memory (RAM) captures. The results are evaluated against the three research objectives 
for verification. 
The final chapter draws conclusions regarding the results of the research, and 
highlights the overall accomplishments of this study. Future research is proposed to 
improve upon the design implemented in the D3 JavaScript Visualization Tool. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
Due to the recent rise of computer crime, Digital Forensic Science has become an 
important subject for Law Enforcement Investigators. This chapter presents the process 
of digital forensics and highlights the specific field of Forensic Memory Analysis. 
Techniques for collecting Windows memory dumps are discussed along with available 
open-source tools for digital memory artifact extraction. The research presented in this 
paper focuses on overcoming the challenges related to digital forensic analysis through 
the application of Information Visualization. Previous related research is discussed and a 
popular visualization tool is explored. 
2.1 Digital Forensics 
 Cyber Crimes involving digital evidence are routinely investigated by law 
enforcement agencies. This field of analysis is commonly referred to as digital forensics, 
or digital forensic science. According to the United States Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team (US-CERT) digital forensics is defined as “the discipline that combines 
elements of law and computer science to collect and analyze data in a way that is 
admissible as evidence in a court of law” (US-CERT, 2008).  
 There are various subdivisions of digital forensics that are generally categorized 
under the following fields: 
1. Computer Forensics – the preservation, identification, extraction, documentation 
and interpretation of computer data (Kruse & Heiser, 2002). 
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2. Mobile Forensics – the analysis of digital evidence obtained from devices such as 
smartphones, cellphones, and PDAs (NIST, 2007). 
3. Network Forensics – the analysis of data collected from active computer network 
traffic to assist with intrusion detection, auditing, and monitoring (Palmer, 2001). 
4. Database Forensics – the study of databases and their associated metadata (Yadav, 
2011). 
A commonly held standard model of the digital forensics process comprising 
seven separate stages was developed by the Digital Forensic Research Workshop 
(Palmer, 2001). The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) currently follows the digital 
forensic model outlined below (Carroll, et al, 2008): 
1. Obtaining and Imaging Forensic Data 
2. Forensic Request 
3. Preparation/Extraction 
4. Identification 
5. Analysis 
6. Forensic Reporting 
7. Case Level Analysis 
 
 
Figure 1. Digital Forensic Process (Carroll, et al, 2008). 
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The visualization method described in Chapter 3 relates to the Analysis phase of the DOJ 
digital forensics process. Before analysis can be performed, collection of appropriate data 
must occur. For this reason, the collection and examination of digital evidence is 
discussed here. 
2.2 Sources of Digital Evidence 
 Digital evidence is defined by the Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence 
(SWGDE) as “[i]nformation of probative value that is stored or transmitted in a binary 
form” (SWGDE, 2011). Computer hardware components which contain storage devices 
and have the potential to contain digital evidence include (NIJ, 2008): 
 Hard Drives – Internal and External 
 Removable Media – CDs, DVDs, Floppy Disks 
 USB Thumb Drives 
 Memory Cards – Secure Digital (SD) Cards, Compact Flash Cards 
 Handheld Devices – Smartphones, PDAs, Tablets, Digital Media Devices 
(Cameras, mp3 Players, iPods, etc.) 
Disk forensics collection methods applied to these devices can provide file-system data 
such as stored files and installed applications. Device physical memory can contain a 
wealth of information not found elsewhere (Carvey, 2009) but is omitted from this list. 
This is due to the volatile nature of memory where forensic collection requires careful 
measures to be taken in order to avoid altering the current state. Most incident response 
plans include the collection of volatile data (NIST, 2006). 
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2.3 Volatile Memory Forensics 
 Memory forensics involves analyzing a static memory image in order to 
determine the current state of the target system. This can be compared to taking a 
snapshot of the system memory for a particular instant in time. Live computer systems 
contain volatile data stored in Random-Access Memory (RAM). If power is no longer 
supplied to the system, the data stored in RAM is lost. Valuable information such as 
network connections, command history, and active process information resides solely in 
RAM (Carvey, 2009). Unique forensic artifacts relating to malware and rootkits reside in 
memory and cannot be discovered through hard disk forensic analysis (Davis, 2008). For 
this reason, the application of memory forensics techniques is critical to obtaining key 
digital evidence. 
2.4 Memory Acquisition 
 Before digital evidence can be obtained from the volatile memory, forensic 
examiners must acquire a physical memory dump (image) from the target device. For the 
purposes of this research, all target machines studied utilize the Microsoft Windows XP 
operating system. Therefore this section discusses the available tools and methods for 
extracting the contents of physical memory from Windows XP computer systems. 
Methods of volatile memory acquisition are categorized as either hardware-based or 
software-based and are discussed in the following sections. 
2.4.1 Hardware-Based Acquisition 
 A PCI expansion card called the Tribble was designed as a proof-of-concept 
device capable of accessing the contents of physical memory on a target computer 
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(Carrier, 2004). The acquisition is performed solely through hardware interaction without 
the need for software to be loaded onto the target. Unfortunately this method requires the 
Tribble card to be connected to the intended system prior to an event warranting forensic 
examination. For this reason, the Tribble is impractical for use in digital forensic 
investigations. 
Currently the most popular hardware-based option for live memory acquisition on 
Windows XP systems involves the use of an external Firewire (IEEE 1394) device. This 
method essentially bypasses the operating system because Firewire specifications allow 
client devices to directly access the host system’s memory (Burdach, 2006). An 
advantage to this technique is the high-speed data transfer rate (approximately 800 
Mbit/sec) obtained through a Firewire connection. 
2.4.2 Software-Based Acquisition 
There are many software-based approaches to volatile data collection which are 
compatible with the Windows XP operating system. Similar to the /dev/mem device in 
Unix operating systems, Windows XP provides RAM access by means of an object 
device (\\.\PhysicalMemory). The Unix based data dumper tool (dd) and the various open 
source versions ported for Windows systems have the ability to read from these memory 
devices and output the data to a local image file (Garnet, 2013). An additional option of 
dd allows the output file to be written to a server on the network (Carrier, 2004). Other 
open source tools for volatile memory acquisition similar to dd include Nigilant32, 
Win32dd, and Memoryze (Carvey, 2009). Win32dd was selected for use in this 
research as described in Chapter 3. 
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The fundamental disadvantage of memory image collection using software-based 
approaches relates to the modifications to the system state due to the collection program 
interactions with the operating system. Software used to extract the image has to be 
loaded into memory, thereby modifying data currently stored in RAM (Davis, 2008). A 
similar issue relates to the operations performed by the kernel during the acquisition 
process. Processor activity that occurs parallel to the collection process affects the output 
image and potentially overwriting digital evidence artifacts (Carvey, 2009). 
Unfortunately, with a software-based approach utilizing the system kernel is essential due 
to processor scheduling and the movement of data to storage (Carrier, 2004). 
2.5 Memory Dump Extraction Tools 
 The third phase of the DOJ digital forensics process model relates to the 
examination of collected data. With respect to memory forensics, this stage involves the 
application of forensic tools on raw memory dumps in an effort to extract digital evidence 
artifacts. 
2.5.1 Volatility Framework 
 Volatility is an open source advanced memory forensics framework released 
under the GNU General Public License. The framework is written in the Python scripting 
language and designed to analyze RAM dumps and extract specific digital artifacts. A 
variety of operating systems are supported including Windows, Linux, Mac OS X, and 
Android. The modular design of Volatility allows for the support of future operating 
systems and architectures. The Volatility Project community is comprised of researchers 
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and professionals operating in the fields of malware analysis, incident response, and 
digital forensics (Volatility, 2013). 
Members of the community develop individual module plugins for the framework 
and submit them to the project for general use. Plugins are organized into the following 
categories: 
 Image Identification 
 Processes and DLLs 
 Process Memory 
 Kernel Memory and Objects 
 Networking 
 Registry 
 Crash Dumps, Hibernation, and Conversion 
 File System 
 Miscellaneous 
Table 2 lists some of the most common modules designed for the Windows 
family of operating systems included in the most recent Volatility release (version 2.3.1). 
These are subsequently used in the research detailed in Chapter 3. 
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Table 2. Volatility (2.3.1) modules for Windows. 
 
 Analysis of physical memory images requires the identification of kernel 
structures and their specific locations. For Windows operating systems this involves 
obtaining the appropriate symbol files from the Microsoft Symbol Server (Microsoft, 
2014). These symbol files must then be converted to a format that can be interpreted by 
the Volatility framework. Volatility includes a bundle of prebuilt profiles for most 
Windows operating systems containing the appropriate symbol files relevant to the OS 
and particular architecture in a format the software can interpret (Volatility, 2013). 
The current release of Volatility (2.3.1) executes from a Windows command 
prompt using a standalone executable (see Figure 2). Plugin modules are run by 
following the command format below: 
“volatility-2.3.1.standalone .exe” vol.py –f [path to memory dump] 
--profile=[OSprofile] [module]  
The output can also be saved to a text file: 
“volatility-2.3.1.standalone .exe” vol.py –f [path to memory dump] 
--profile=[OSprofile] [module] > [path/filename].txt 
Module Plugin Description 
imageinfo 
Display identified operating system, service pack, and 
architecture 
connections 
Lists the TCP connections active at the time of memory 
acquisition 
handles Lists the open handles for all processes 
pslist List the active processes of the system 
sockets Lists the listening network sockets for any protocol 
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Figure 2. Volatility Command Prompt in Windows. 
 
2.5.2 Compiled Memory Analysis Tool (CMAT) 
 The Compiled Memory Analysis Tool (CMAT) is an alternative open source 
utility capable of analyzing and extracting data from Windows RAM dump images. 
CMAT is developed using C++ in contrast to the Volatility Framework which uses 
Python.  CMAT also requires access to the appropriate program database (PDB) symbol 
files from the Microsoft Symbol Server to identify the appropriate kernel structures and 
locations (Okolica & Peterson, 2011). Unlike Volatility, CMAT automatically obtains the 
correct symbol files from the Microsoft Symbol Server directly and does not require 
formatting. 
CMAT is executed from a command prompt in Windows (see Figure 3) using the 
following command format: 
cmat.exe  [dumpfile name] -data [path for output files] 
 
Output from CMAT is organized into six feature files as listed in Table 3. 
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Figure 3. CMAT Command Prompt in Windows. 
. 
Table 3. CMAT Output Feature Files. 
 
The feature files are placed in the specified output path. Figure 4 provides an example of 
the feature file contents. 
Feature 
File 
Data Details 
1 Process Information Process IDs, Process Names, User IDs 
2 Network Information 
Network connections active at time of 
memory acquisition 
3 Process Loaded Modules Loaded modules by Process ID 
4 Process File Handles Open Files by Process ID 
5 Process Registry Keys Registry Keys by Process ID 
6 System Loaded Modules System Drivers by Name 
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180 svchost.exe C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe 
180 kernel32.dll C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll 
180 ADVAPI32.dll C:\WINDOWS\system32\ADVAPI32.dll 
180 RPCRT4.dll C:\WINDOWS\system32\RPCRT4.dll 
180 Secur32.dll C:\WINDOWS\system32\Secur32.dll 
180 ShimEng.dll C:\WINDOWS\system32\ShimEng.dll 
180 AcGenral.DLL C:\WINDOWS\AppPatch\AcGenral.DLL 
180 USER32.dll C:\WINDOWS\system32\USER32.dll 
180 GDI32.dll  C:\WINDOWS\system32\GDI32.dll 
180 WINMM.dll  C:\WINDOWS\system32\WINMM.dll 
180 ole32.dll  C:\WINDOWS\system32\ole32.dll 
180 msvcrt.dll C:\WINDOWS\system32\msvcrt.dll 
180 OLEAUT32.dll C:\WINDOWS\system32\OLEAUT32.dll 
180 MSACM32.dll C:\WINDOWS\system32\MSACM32.dll 
180 VERSION.dll C:\WINDOWS\system32\VERSION.dll 
 
Figure 4. CMAT Feature File Contents. 
 
2.6 Forensic Data Analysis 
 The Analysis phase of the NIST digital forensic process occurs after all relevant 
data is extracted from the target device. Forensic Analysts tackle the difficult task of 
inspecting the various tables of extracted data in an attempt to gain a perspective on the 
state of the system at the time of memory acquisition. In many cases, the objective is to 
discover hidden activity or unusual phenomena in the extracted datasets. 
2.6.1 Information Visualization 
 One proposed method of improving the Analysis process involves applying 
Information Visualization techniques to the forensic data. Humans tend to comprehend 
raw data more efficiently when it is presented in a visual form. Research has shown that 
people possess the skills to “visually interpret and comprehend pictures, video, and charts 
much faster than reading a textual description of the same” (Teerlink & Erbacher, 2006). 
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Shneiderman (1996) notes the human ability to “scan, recognize, and recall images 
rapidly” in addition to the natural capacity for identifying “changes in size, color, shape, 
movement, or texture.” 
  Ware (2004), a leading researcher in the applied science of Information 
Visualization, lists the following advantages to utilizing InfoVis: 
 Visualization provides an ability to comprehend huge amounts of data. 
 Visualization allows the perception of emergent properties that were not 
anticipated. 
 Visualization often enables problems with the data itself to become immediately 
apparent. A visualization commonly reveals things not only about the data itself, 
but about the way it is collected. 
 Visualization facilitates understanding of both large-scale and small-scale features 
of the data. 
 Visualization facilitates hypothesis formation. 
2.6.2 EIC Process 
 The Explore, Investigate, and Correlate (EIC) process (Osborne, 2012) stems 
from recent research applying Information Visualization to digital forensics. The process 
consists of a set of methods to overcome the issue of comprehending large and complex 
digital forensic datasets.  
 The specific goals of the EIC process model are as follows: 
 Make the evidence visible. 
 Reduce the relative size of the evidence. 
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 Provide high-level overviews of the evidence first. 
 Aid in the presentation of the events and relationships in the evidence. 
 Provide explanations of the origin or significance of evidence. 
 Provide support to help identify items of probative value. 
 Facilitate the presentation of these findings to other investigators or in 
court. 
In the Explore phase the human user is presented with a high-level overview of 
the data in its entirety. Through interactions with the visualization the user Investigates 
the data by applying filters or specifying a focus. The Correlate phase presents a low-
level view which highlights specific relationships within the data as well as behavior 
patterns. Figure 5 provides a flow-chart diagram of the EIC Process. The research did not 
include the development of new visualization methods, but instead focused on applying 
established techniques that are simplistic in nature. 
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Figure 5. EIC Process Flowchart (Osborne, 2012).
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2.7 Visualization Tools 
Many tools exist for creating interactive visualization based on large datasets. Due 
to limited funding for this research the software packages explored in this section are 
limited to open-source libraries. Two of the most popular options are discussed here. 
 2.7.1 Gephi Visualization Software 
The Gephi software package is capable of providing interactive graphical 
visualizations of complex datasets (Gephi, 2014). Gephi is especially helpful in 
presenting network data with various hierarchical and clustering characteristics (Bastian, 
et al, 2009). The software is written in Java and utilizes the OpenGL library for rendering 
graphical content. Figures 6 provides an example of a weighted network visualization 
using Gephi illustrating the co-appearance of characters in the novel Les Miserables. 
 
Figure 6. Co-Appearance of Characters in Les Miserables (Gephi, 2014). 
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Another example of Gephi visualization is shown in Figure 7 below which depicts 
Twitter network data. 
 
Figure 7. Twitter Network Visualization (Gephi, 2014). 
 
2.7.2 D3 JavaScript Visualization 
Data-Driven Documents (D3) is a JavaScript library designed to manipulate 
interactive data through Hyper-Text Markup Language (HTML), Cascading Style Sheets 
(CSS), and Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) inside a web browser. Data is bound to a 
Document Object Model (DOM) and transformed to display various visualizations. The 
D3 library is especially appropriate for visualizing digital forensic data considering its 
ability to support large datasets with a relatively small overhead (Bostock, 2014).  
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 Figure 8 shown below contains an example of a Bubble Chart visualization. This 
particular image depicts the frequency of words contained in the D3 JavaScript website 
homepage (www.d3js.org). Larger bubbles represent words that occur more often than 
others. 
 
Figure 8. Bubble Chart of D3 Homepage (Bostock, 2014). 
 
Figure 9 illustrates the political contributions for the 2012 Election Cycle using colored 
bubble nodes to represent the candidates and arc slices to represent each Political Action 
Committee (PAC). Bubble and path sizes are proportional to contribution amounts from 
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PACs to political candidates. Interaction with the visualization allows the user to explore 
datasets from both the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. 
 
 
Figure 9. Political Contributions 2012 Visualization (Brightpoint, 2014). 
 
Figure 10 provides a static image from another interactive visualization which details 
historical data from the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
(NASDAQ) stock exchange. This example demonstrates the ability of the D3 JavaScript 
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Library to portray multiple visualizations including histograms, bar charts, pie charts, and 
circle graphs in one interactive view. 
For the purposes of this research, the D3 JavaScript library was selected to create 
interactive visualization. The main advantage to utilizing D3 is its ability to run in most 
web browsers making the tool developed in Chapter 3 extremely portable. 
 
 
Figure 10. NASDAQ Interactive Chart (NASDAQ, 2014). 
2.8 Summary 
 This chapter described the process of digital forensics with an emphasis on the 
specific field of Forensic Memory Analysis. Topics discussed include the significance of 
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memory analysis, methods of acquiring RAM dumps from Windows computers, and 
open source memory artifact extraction tools. The applied science of Information 
Visualization is explored as a possible solution for overcoming some of the challenges 
associated with large and complex datasets. Both the Gephi software package and the D3 
JavaScript library are examined as potential interactive visualization tools. D3 is 
ultimately selected for use in this research due to its versatility and portability. 
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III. Methodology 
 Various open-source programs exists which are capable of extracting digital 
evidence from forensic memory dumps. While many of these tools provide textual output 
to the user, locating key information in the digital evidence proves challenging. With the 
increasing complexity of digital forensic collections, analysts find it difficult to 
understand the unique state of the system at the time of memory capture. This research 
applies Information Visualization techniques to the forensic memory analysis process by 
providing analysts with both global and local views of the extracted data. The interactive 
tool assists in identifying items of interest and recognizing behavior patterns in the data. 
This chapter describes the specific goals of the research as well as the design 
approach to achieving the outlined objectives. The process for obtaining forensic memory 
captures from Windows systems is discussed and the method of extracting digital 
artifacts is outlined. Additionally, the chapter provides the Information Visualization 
tools and techniques used to develop an interactive tool for forensic memory analysis. 
The basic functionality of the tool is covered in along with the specific features that 
provide unique visual support to the user. 
3.1 Research Objectives 
 The goal of this research is the development of a proof-of-concept model for 
visualizing data extracted from a forensic memory image. The specific objectives are 
outlined as follows: 
1. Represent multiple datasets extracted from a forensic memory image in an 
interactive visual with one universal view of the target system. 
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2. Filter a global dataset for a particular system and visually express the 
following associations: 
 The relationship between a specific system process and its associated 
resources. 
 The relationship between a specific system resource and its associated 
processes. 
3. Assist in the visual identification of unique patterns and new pieces of 
information from datasets. 
3.2 Assumptions 
Assumptions related to achieving the objectives include: 
1. Digital forensic methods exist for obtaining an accurate physical memory image. 
2. The extracted datasets under consideration for each system are limited to process 
lists, network connections, system services, open file handles, system registry 
keys, and loaded modules. 
3. The operating systems under consideration is limited to Microsoft Windows XP. 
3.3 System Design 
 
Figure 11. Forensic Memory Analysis Process. 
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Figure 11 illustrates the three step process for collecting, extracting, and 
analyzing forensic memory images. The primary focus of this research is the third step of 
the process which involves the development of a software tool capable of generating 
interactive visualizations from datasets extracted from Windows RAM dumps. The 
overall objective is to provide a functional system that is flexible enough to support 
future datasets from various operating system platforms and architectures. Additionally, 
the interface design should be simplistic and easy to use for both skilled and non-skilled 
Digital Forensic Analysts. The visualization tool should have the ability to operate on a 
range of workstation platforms used for forensic analysis. 
3.3.1 Memory Acquisition 
 Several Windows-based computers provide the source memory data for testing 
the visualization tool. Each machine is created and configured to produce unique process 
activity. The test computers are VMWare virtual machines. Table 4 contains a summary 
of the test machines and their configurations. Forensic memory dump acquisition is 
performed via a software-based approach by running win32dd on each machine. 
3.3.2 Malware Background 
This section provides specific background information regarding the two types of 
malware used in this research. The malware include FUTo and Poison Ivy, a Remote 
Administration Tool (RAT). 
Rootkits maintain access to a system by hiding their activity from the system user. 
The FUTo rootkit, for example, removes references to itself from the active process list 
data structures (Stevenson & Altholz, 2006). Unlike many rootkits that employ forms of  
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Table 4. Test Machine Configurations. 
 
 
API-hooking, FUTo uses Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) to directly modify 
kernel structures including the PspCidTable (Silberman & C.H.A.O.S., 2005). 
Poison Ivy is a Remote Administration Tool piece of malware that can perform 
malicious activity such as “key logging, screen capturing, video capturing, file transfers, 
password theft, system administration, traffic relaying, and more” (Bennett, et al, 2013). 
Poison Ivy can also be configured to inject itself into a browser process. This allows the 
RAT to effectively bypass the firewall and make outgoing connections at will. 
Dataset Label Operating System Unique Process Activity 
WinXP IE Windows XP SP3 
Active Internet Explorer  
(v. 8.0.6001.18702) Process 
WinXP Chrome Windows XP SP3 
Active Google Chrome 
(v. 34.0.1847.131) Process 
WinXP Firefox Windows XP SP3 
Active Mozilla Firefox 
(v. 28.0) Process 
WinXP Solitaire Windows XP SP3 Active Solitaire Process 
WinXP Word Windows XP SP3 Active Microsoft Word Process 
WinXP Malware 1 Windows XP SP3 FUTo Malware hiding Solitaire Process 
WinXP Malware 2 Windows XP SP3 
Remote Administration Tool 
Malware (hidden) 
WinXP Malware 3 Windows XP SP3 
Remote Administration Tool Malware 
(hidden using different process) 
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3.3.3 Forensic Data Extraction 
 Each forensic memory image is processed by the Volatility Framework (discussed 
in Section 2.5.1) to extract digital artifacts. Table 5 lists the specific plugin modules 
executed on each memory dump file. The tool exports each dataset as a text file which is 
labeled according to content and source machine (i.e., Process_List_Chrome.txt, 
Connections_Firefox.txt). 
 The images are also processed using the CMAT utility (see Section 2.6.2) to 
extract data and generate the associated feature files. These feature files are compared 
against the Volatility output files for discrepancies in the data. Unfortunately both CMAT 
and Volatility lack the capability to extract data from a memory image relating to 
Running Services. For the purposes of this research, the information is obtained via the 
tasklist command-line tool included in Windows installations. The tool is executed 
at the time of memory acquisition in order to obtain a complete dataset. Sample output is 
depicted in Figure 12 below. Each listing is output to a text data file. 
 
Table 5. Volatility Plugins Executed on Test Images. 
 
Module Plugin Description 
connections View the TCP connections active at the time of memory acquisition 
handles Display the list of open handles for all processes 
pslist List the active processes of the system 
sockets View the listening network sockets for any protocol 
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C:\Users\Agent>tasklist /svc 
 
Image Name                     PID Services 
========================= ======== =================== 
System Idle Process              0 N/A 
System                           4 N/A 
smss.exe                       372 N/A 
csrss.exe                      504 N/A 
wininit.exe                    580 N/A 
csrss.exe                      604 N/A 
services.exe                   644 N/A 
lsass.exe                      664 KeyIso, Netlogon, SamSs 
lsm.exe                        696 N/A 
winlogon.exe                   744 N/A 
svchost.exe                    828 DcomLaunch, PlugPlay, Power 
nvvsvc.exe                     892 nvsvc 
nvSCPAPISvr.exe                916 Stereo Service 
svchost.exe                    960 RpcEptMapper, RpcSs 
MsMpEng.exe                    160 MsMpSvc 
svchost.exe                    592 AudioSrv, Dhcp 
Figure 12. tasklist Command-Line Output. 
 
3.3.4 Data Formatting 
 The extracted datasets for each Memory Dump require conversion from text files 
into the JSON format that can be used by the D3 JavaScript visualization software.  This 
is accomplished by importing each text file into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and 
subsequently exporting as a comma separated values (CSV) file. Because this research is 
a proof-of-concept, the design lacks an automated process for completing this task and 
must be performed manually. The correctly formatted CSV output files are directly 
imported into the Visualization tool described in the next section. 
3.3.5 Visualization Tool Design 
The tool developed in this thesis utilizes the D3 JavaScript visualization library to 
manipulate HTML, CSS, and SVG objects within a web environment. The advantage of 
utilizing JavaScript in an active web environment is the ability to use the visualization 
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tool on most web browsers. For testing purposes the tool is hosted locally through a 
simple Apache web server. 
 Table 6 contains a listing of the source files included in the visualization tool 
working directory along with brief descriptions of each resource. The main effort of this 
research involved writing and debugging the source files which contain approximately 
four thousand lines of JavaScript code. The only source file not authored in this research 
is the D3 JavaScript Library file. A sequence diagram outlining basic functionality of the 
developed visualization tool is depicted in Figure 13. 
Table 6. Visualization Tool Source Files. 
 
File Name Description 
index.html HTML source file 
globals.js Global variable definitions 
buttons.js Interactive button action definitions 
initialize.js Functions for initializing the interface 
update.js Functions for updating the visualization 
get.js Data accessor functions 
events.js Mouse click event functions 
d3.v3.min.js D3 JavaScript Library 
style.css File specifying CSS Style options 
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Figure 13. Visualization Tool Sequence Diagram.
* Actor 1 Sie<:d e t ataset ~ I I . I I ;J 1.1: currentDataset() I I I I 
I I 
2: Click Fetch Data Button I I . 2.1: in~iaiFetch() ! 
3: Click Initialize Button .. · ~ ... 3.1: setupHierarchy() .. 
3.2: in~ialize() ~~ 
3.3: u pdateNodes() 
--y .. I 
I ... 
3.4: u pdate(getResourcesOl! .. 3.4.1: getResources() ... .. ... 
..,.3.4.1.1: retum resouroelist ... 
4: Select a Process Node 
I I I I I .. 
1 ... 4.2: highlightNode() ! 
... -
l,J..,. I 
1 ... 4.3: u pdate(getResources(PID)) 
4.1: onMouseCiick(node, "PROC") 
... 
4.3.1: getResources(PI D) ., 
I 
... 4.3.1.1: retum resouroelist ... 
+-... 
I 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
5: Sele<:t Resource Arc Slice1 I I I 
I I 5.2: highlightMatchingProcs(l 
. 
;J I y I I 
I I 
5.1: onMouseCiick(arc, "RESOURCE") 
I I I I 
I I I I 
I I I I 
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3.3.6 Visualization Tool Layout 
 Figure 14 provides a view of the main user-interface with outlines highlighting 
the three distinct regions of the interface. The top of the page contains a dataset selector 
menu and multiple buttons. The center main region contains the interactive visualization 
while the green pane on the right displays instruction and selected data details. 
 
 
Figure 14. Visualization Interface Layout. 
The interactive visualization region is divided into three major components (Figure 15): 
 Process Nodes – Hierarchical layout containing bubble nodes representing system 
processes. 
 Resource Arcs – System resource lists divided into arcs and color coded 
according to type which include File Handle, Key Handles, Loaded Modules, 
Services, Ports, and Sockets. 
Dataset 
Menu Function Buttons 
Interactive Visualization 
Region 
Instructions/ 
Details Pane 
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 Links – Colored links connecting resources and their associated process nodes. 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Visualization Region Components. 
Process Nodes 
Resource Arcs 
Links 
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3.4 Visualization Tool Functionality 
 This section provides steps detailing the basic functions of the visualization tool. 
3.4.1 Dataset Selection and Initialization 
The following steps are used to select and initialize datasets: 
1. Click the drop-down menu and select a dataset. 
2. Click the Fetch Data button to import the appropriate CSV data files. 
3. Click Initialize Data button to initiate the interactive visualization. 
3.4.2 Visualization Interaction 
The visualization tool is designed to follow a process flow similar to the Explore, 
Investigate, and Correlate (EIP) Process described in Chapter 2. Upon initialization, the 
visualization depicts a high-level global view of the system. The resource arcs are 
populated with a complete listing of system resources which the user can Explore by 
clicking to expand as shown in Figure 16. 
Interacting with the visualization allows the user to Investigate areas of interest by 
means of process node highlighting and resource arc slice filtering. The resulting local 
view provides a low-level perspective of the system by displaying the connections 
between processes and resources. By investigating areas of interest, the user discovers 
highlighted relationships within the datasets. This can be accomplished in three ways: 
1. Clicking on a Process Bubble Node (see Figure 17) 
 Process Node is highlighted. 
 Resource arcs are filtered to list files, keys, modules, services, ports, 
and sockets associated with the selected process. 
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2. Clicking on a Resource Slice (see Figure 18) 
 Process Nodes accessing selected resources are highlighted. 
3. Clicking the Apply Resource Filter button (see Figure 19) 
 Resource arcs are filtered to contain all open ports, open sockets, 
user files, and executable loaded modules for all system processes. 
 
The final feature of the visualization allows users to both highlight specific 
relationships as well as identify behavior patterns by overlaying colored links from an 
expanded list of resource slices to all related process nodes. This is accomplished by 
selecting the Toggle Links button at the top of the interface while in an expanded 
resource list view (i.e., currently viewing expanded Sockets List) as shown in Figure 20. 
This mechanism assists the user in discovering Correlations within the data through 
visual aids. 
Additional features of the visualization include: 
 Tooltips displaying process names on mouse over 
 Tooltips displaying full resource labels on mouse over 
 Process summary data displayed in green data details pane when 
node selected (see Figure 17) 
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Figure 16. Expanded Resource Arc – Sockets List. 
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Figure 17. Process Bubble Selected – Resource Arcs Filtered. 
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Figure 18. Resource Slice Selected – Associated Process Nodes Highlighted. 
... vice\Nam~~~~~~~~ffi~~iFr~)~~~ 
... vice\NamedPipe\net\NtControiPipe1 
... ice\NamedPipe\net\NtControiPipe1 0 
... ice\NamedPipe\net\NtControiPipe12 
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... vice\NamedPipe\net\NtControiPipe3 
... vice\NamedPipe\net\NtControiPipe4 
... vice\NamedPipe\net\NtControiPipeS 
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Figure 19. Apply Resource Filter Button Selected. 
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Figure 20. Links displayed – Sockets List Expanded. 
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3.5 Summary 
This chapter outlined the research objectives and specific design approach to 
accomplishing those goals. The process for obtaining forensic memory captures from 
Windows machines is discussed along with the techniques used to extract digital artifacts 
from the dumps. The two types of malware that exist in the test memory dumps are 
reviewed to outline their basic behavioral characteristics.  
The last portion of the chapter provides a functional overview of the Visualization 
tool user interface. Basic features of the software are presented including the global 
system view and potential user interactions resulting in a more local view of the system. 
The addition of visual links to connect resources and associated processes assists the user 
in locating unique patterns and information of significance within the digital forensic 
datasets.
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IV. Analysis and Results 
In order to assess the abilities of the visualization tool developed in this research, 
test forensic memory images are created and acquired. The forensic memory analysis 
tools previously described are then executed to extract digital artifacts from the dumps. 
The resulting datasets are formatted using Microsoft Excel for import into the 
visualization tool. 
This chapter describes the application of the D3 JavaScript Visualization tool to 
various test datasets acquired from a number of Windows XP memory dumps. The results 
from each of the sample datasets are evaluated against the three research goals. The first 
goal involves providing a global view of the data that is extracted from forensic memory 
dumps using memory analysis tools. The second goal requires that the visualization tool 
possess the ability to filter the forensic datasets and highlight two types of relationships. 
These include the association between a process and its corresponding resources, and the 
connections between a particular resource and the processes accessing it. The third goal 
states that the visualization tool should contain features that assist the user in identifying 
unique patterns and interesting items within the datasets. Each objective is discussed in 
detail in the following sections. 
4.1 Goal 1: Global View of Data from Memory Analysis Tools 
 The first goal requires the visualization tool provide an interactive global view of 
the data output from forensic memory image analysis tools. Ultimately this visualization 
should allow the user to explore the entire set of available information extracted from a 
memory capture. 
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 The visualization tool meets this objective by: 
 Providing a global view of the target system based on the datasets 
extracted from the respective memory dump. 
 Populating the resource arcs with lists of complete system resources based 
on six categories (files, registry keys, loaded modules, services, ports, and 
sockets). 
 Allowing the user to explore the resources by expanding/reducing each 
resource arc slice. 
This goal is met by the full process hierarchy (node layout) and global resource listing 
(expandable arcs) as shown in Figure 21. For this particular dataset there are a total of 34 
processes, 374 unique file handles, 268 registry key handles, 349 loaded modules, 44 
active services, 3 open ports, and 15 open sockets which populate the visualization. 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Overall System View. 
Global View containing  
Full Process Node 
Hierarchy and Fully 
Populated Resource  
Arcs. 
 
 
 
Users explore full  
listing of global  
resources by expanding 
each colored arc. 
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4.2 Goal 2: Filter Data and Display Relationships 
 The second goal states that the visualization tool should possess the ability to 
filter the datasets and highlight the relationship between: 
 A single process and its associated resources (Figure 22) 
 A single resource and its associated processes (Figure 23) 
These goals are evidently satisfied as portrayed by the selected process and associated 
resource arcs (Figure 22) as well as the selected loaded module resource and associated 
processes (Figure 23). 
The purpose of this objective is to understand the behavior of the system by 
visualizing the low-level connections between objects. It is through this local view of the 
data that relevant information is discovered. 
4.3 Goal 3: Assist in Identifying New Data and Patterns 
 The third research goal states that the visualization tool should assist the user in 
identifying unique patterns and new pieces of information within the datasets. To verify 
this objective, each dataset contains unique process activity at the time of memory 
capture (see Table 4). There are two methods that can be applied to spot unique activity 
or new data: 
1. Toggle links to display multiple resource relationships (limited to single 
resource type) in one view. 
2. Compare trusted system visualization (containing only legitimate process 
activity) to an untrusted system visualization (containing a hidden process, 
rootkit, or other malware). 
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Figure 22. Visualization filtered for single process. 
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Figure 23. Visualization filtered for single resource.
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Four datasets are labeled as trusted systems running a single instance of a 
legitimate process while three other datasets contain some form of malware. The above 
methods are applied to evaluate the third overall research goal. 
4.3.1 Windows XP SP3 (Internet Explorer) – Trusted Image 
The first memory image consists of a single instance of Internet Explorer running 
on a Windows XP SP3 machine. Applying the unique resource filter provides a list of 
connections (ports and sockets), user files, and loaded modules. Clicking on the Socket 
and Port Resource arcs populates the resource ring with the respective resource lists. 
Using method 1 from above, toggling the links when viewing both lists produce 
visualizations that provides the user with some unique patterns (see Figures 24, 25). 
There are numerous connections surrounding one particular process, which upon 
examination is the IEXPLORER.EXE process running inside another instance of 
IEXPLORER.EXE.  
Filtering the global resource list by clicking the Apply Resource Filter button and 
selecting the red loaded modules arc slice populates the resource ring with the list of 
executable loaded modules. Toggling the links for this list provides another view (see 
Figure 26). By browsing this short list the user can identify the iexplorer.exe 
module and verify that it is loaded by the appropriate IEXPLORE.EXE process node. 
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Figure 24. IE – Socket List Links. 
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Figure 25. IE – Port List Links. 
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Port 1734 
Port 1733 
Port 1732 
Port 1730 
Port 1729 
Port 1728 
Port 1727 
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Figure 26. IE – Loaded Modules (.exe) Links.
c..:l W-"i""nX'-"P---=IE:__ __ _j• l I Fe1chDa1a I I Initialize Data I System View I I Apply Resource Filter I I Toggle Links I 
cmd.exe winlogon.exe 
ctfmon.exe win32dd.exe 
I iexplore.exe vmtools-d.exe 
service:s.exe vmacthtp.exe 
svchost.exe 
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4.3.2 Windows XP SP3 (Google Chrome) – Trusted Image 
The second memory image is from a Windows XP machine executing a single 
instance of Google Chrome. Applying the unique resource filter provides a list of 
connections (ports and sockets), user files, and loaded modules. Clicking on the Socket 
and Port Resource arcs populates the resource ring with the respective resource lists. 
Using method 1 and clicking the Toggle Links button when viewing each list provides the 
user with unique visualizations (see Figures 27, 28). The cluster of CHROME.EXE nodes 
can be identified by three socket connections, as well as the only three active open ports 
on the system.   
Filtering the global resource list by clicking the Apply Resource Filter button and 
selecting the red loaded modules arc slice populates the resource ring with the list of 
executable loaded modules. Toggling the links for this list provides another view (see 
Figure 29). By browsing this short list the user can identify the chrome.exe module 
and verify that it is loaded by the appropriate CHROME.EXE process node as indicated 
by the highlighted node cluster. 
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Figure 27. Chrome – Sockets List Links. 
socket:[O] 
socket:[1 028] 
socket:[1 030] 
socket:[123] 
socket:[135] 
socket:[137] 
socket:[138] 
socket:[139] 
I WinXP Chrome • I I Fetch Data I I Init ialize Data I System View I I Apply Resource Filter I I Toggle Links I 
socket:[500] 
socket:[4500] 
socket:[445] 
socket:[1900] 
socket:[1649] 
socket:[1648] 
socket:[1645] 
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Figure 28. Chrome – Ports List Links. 
I WinXP Chrome •I I FetchData I I Init ia lize Data I I System View I I Apply Resource Filter J J Togg le links I 
Port 1645 Port 1649 
Port 1648 
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Figure 29. Chrome – Loaded Modules (.exe) Links.
I WinXP Chrome • I I Fetch Data I ! Initia lize Data I System Vie w I I Apply Resource Filte r I I Toggle Links I 
alg.ex e w s.cntfy.ex e 
chrome.ex e winlogon.ex e 
cmd.ex e w in32dd.ex e 
csrss.ex e v mtools.d.ex e 
ctfmon.ex e vmacthlp.ex e 
lsass.ex e svchost.ex e 
ms.iex ec.ex e spoolsv.ex e 
msmsgs.ex e smss.ex e 
rundll32.ex e services .ex e 
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4.3.3 Windows XP SP3 (Mozilla Firefox) – Trusted Source 
The third trusted memory dump is from a Windows XP machine executing a single 
instance of Mozilla Firefox. Applying the unique resource filter provides a list of 
connections (ports and sockets), user files, and loaded modules. Clicking on the Socket 
and Port Resource arcs populates the resource ring with the respective resource lists. 
Applying method 1 and clicking the Toggle Links button when viewing each list provides 
the user with unique visualizations (see Figures 30, 31). An instance of PLUGIN-
CONTAINER.EXE is running inside a FIREFOX.EXE process node and can be 
identified by eleven socket connections, as well as the only eleven active open ports on 
the system.  
Filtering the global resource list by clicking the Apply Resource Filter button and 
selecting the red loaded modules arc slice populates the resource ring with the list of 
executable loaded modules. Toggling the links for this list provides another view (see 
Figure 32). By browsing this short list the user can identify the firefox.exe and 
plugin-container.exe modules and verify that they are loaded by the appropriate 
FIREFOX.EXE and PLUGIN_CONTAINER.EXE process nodes as indicated by the 
highlighted nodes. 
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Figure 30. Firefox – Socket List Links. 
socket:(O) 
socket:(1 028) 
socket:(1 030) 
socket:(123) 
socket:(135) 
socket:(137) 
socket:(138) 
socket:(139) 
socket:(1661) 
socket:(1662) 
socket:(1727) 
socket:(1758) 
c..:l W..:.:i::::nXc::.P...:Fc..:i:.:re:.:fo.:.:.x __ •--'1 I FetchData I I Initia lize Data I I System View I I Apply Resource Filter I I Togg le links I 
socket:(SOO) 
socket:(4SOO) 
socket:(445) 
socket:(21 06) 
socket:(2101) 
socket:(2089) 
socket:(1951) 
socket:(1925) 
socket:(1900) 
socket:(1784) 
socket:(1778) 
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Figure 31. Firefox – Port List Links. 
L[ W:..:..::_in::..:X _P_:_F.::.ire::.:f::.:ox_:__•_J[ I Fetch Data I I Initialize Data I System View I I Apply Resource Filter I I Toggle Links I 
Port 1661 Port 2106 
Port 1662 Port 2101 
Port 1727 Port 2089 
Port 1758 Port 1951 
Port 1778 Port 1925 
Port 1784 
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Figure 32. Firefox – Loaded Modules (.exe) Links.
c..:l W..:.:i::::nXc::.P...:Fc..:i:.:re:.:fo.:.:.x __ •--'1 I FetchData I I Initia lize Data I I System View I I Apply Resource Filter I I Togg le links I 
cmd.exe win32dd.exe 
firefox.exe vmtoolsd.exe 
plu gin-container. exe svchc..st.exe 
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4.3.4 Windows XP SP3 (Solitaire) – Trusted Source 
The fourth trusted memory image is from a Windows XP machine executing a 
single instance of Solitaire. Again the unique resource filter provides a list of connections 
(ports and sockets), user files, and loaded modules. Clicking on the Socket Resource arc 
populates the resource ring with the respective resource list. Applying method 1 and 
clicking the Toggle Links button when viewing the socket list provides the user with the 
visualization in Figure 33, however, none of the sockets are connected to the SOL.EXE 
process. There are no open ports and therefore no associated unique visualization.  
Filtering the global resource list by clicking the Apply Resource Filter button and 
selecting the red loaded modules arc slice populates the resource ring with the list of 
executable loaded modules. Toggling the links for this list provides another view (see 
Figure 34). By browsing this short list the user can identify the sol.exe module and 
verify that they it is loaded by the appropriate SOL.EXE process as indicated by the 
highlighted node. 
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Figure 33. Solitaire – Socket List Links. 
I WinXP Solitaire • I I FetchData I I Initia lize Data I I System View I I App ly Resource Filter I I Togg le links I 
socket:(O) socket:(SOO) 
socket:(1 028) socket:(4500) 
socket:(123) socket:(445) 
socket:(135) socket:(1900) 
socket:(137) socket:(139) 
socket:(138) 
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Figure 34. Solitaire – Loaded Modules (.exe) Links.
I WinXP Solitaire • I I Fetch Data I I Initia lize Data I System View I I Apply Resource Filter I I Toggle Links I 
alg.exe wscntfy.exe 
cmd.exe winlogon.exe 
csrss.exe win32dd.exe 
ctfmon.exe vmtoolsd.exe 
lsass.exe vmacthlp.exe 
msmsgs.exe svchost.exe 
rundll32.exe spoolsv.exe 
services.exe ~ 
smss.exe 
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4.3.5 Windows XP SP3 (Word) – Trusted Source 
The fifth trusted memory image is from a Windows XP machine executing a 
single instance of Microsoft Word. The unique resource filter provides a list of sockets, 
user files, and loaded modules. There are no open ports in this dataset. The Word process 
is discovered by exploring the node layout as seen in Figure 35. Applying method 1 and 
clicking the Toggle Links button when viewing the files list provides the user with the 
visualization in Figure 36. This visualization lists many items including the open 
document (.docx), a Word template (Normal.dotm), a picture file (.jpeg), and various 
temp files. The combination of the .docx file residing in the users directory and the temp 
files reflects the fact that the document was in the process of being edited at the moment 
of memory capture. 
 One of the objectives for digital forensic practitioners is to gain an insight into the 
specific user activity on a target device through analysis of the collection data. This 
particular test dataset provides an example of how the interactive visualization could 
prove useful to an analyst in identifying specific document editing activity. The same 
technique could be used to locate other instances of user activity such as recent web 
browsing, email editing, social networking, peer-to-peer file exchanges, and multimedia 
viewing. This information is valuable to digital forensic investigators looking to develop 
an activity profile of the system user. 
  
 
66 
 
Figure 35. Word - Process Highlighted. 
Ll W'-'-"-'inX:..cP_ W.:..:...:.o:..crd __ •-'1 I FetchData I I Initialize Data I I System View I I Apply Resource Filter I I Toggle links I 
No Open Sockets Files 
No Open Ports Keys 
No Running Services Loaded Modules 
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Figure 36. Word – Files List.
c..:l W_:.:i::::nXc::.P_W:.:..::orc::.d __ •_,l I FetchData I I Initialize Data I I System View I 
... ts\Thesis_Draft_Baum_Revised.docx 
... ttings\Administrator\My Documen1s 
1898- 4566-A285-031084C3A8A7}.tmp I 
8138- 4 71A -AC38-2986EE 40F875}.tmp 
I Apply Resource Filter I I Toggle links I 
I 
I 
I ... a\Microsoft\Templates\Normal dotm T 
N< 
PII 
pp 
Tt 
... t Files\Content.I.!SO\F9482450.jpeg H c 
S t 
I ... -A501-4AOA -A E08-439708213A66} tmp I 
... -A98D-4DE5-83AF-94C7FE45626C}.tmp I 
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4.3.6 Windows XP SP3 (Malware 1) 
The sixth memory dump tested is from a Windows XP machine executing an 
instance of the FUTo malware. The unique resource filter provides a list of connections 
(ports and sockets), user files, and loaded modules. Clicking on the Socket Resource arc 
populates the resource ring with the respective resource list. Applying method 1 and 
clicking the Toggle Links button when viewing the socket list provides the user with the 
visualization in Figure 37. Although examination does not provide any immediate 
observations, comparison with previous trusted examples reveals a similarity with the 
Solitaire image in the socket list link layout pattern (see Figures 33, 37). Closer 
inspection uncovers the only difference, namely, the absence of a SOL.EXE process 
node in the malware sample. There are no open ports and therefore no associated unique 
visualization. 
The FUTo malware (discussed in Section 3.3.2) hides an active process by 
removing references to it in various kernel data structures. Since the process list extracted 
from memory is generated by walking these data structures, the hidden process will not 
appear as a node and instead exist as a loaded module attached to a system process. A 
review of the loaded modules for the System Idle Process reveals a sol.exe 
module connected to it (see Figure 38). Under normal circumstances, the System 
Idle Process would not load the Microsoft Solitaire program as a module. From this 
verification, there is sufficient evidence to categorize this as a potential implementation 
of  a rootkit. 
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Figure 37. Malware 1 – Socket List Links. 
I WinXP Malware 1 • I I Fe tchDa ta I I Initia lize Da ta I I Syste m Vie w I I Apply Resource Filte r I I Togg le links I 
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Figure 38. Malware 1 – Loaded Modules (.exe) Links.
I WinXP Malware 1 T I I Fetch Data I I Initialize Data I I System View I I Apply Resource Filter I I Toggle Links I 
s.ervices.exe spoolsv.exe 
smss.ex e B 
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4.3.7 Windows XP SP3 (Malware 2) 
This seventh dump image also has some form of malware operating on the system 
at the time of memory acquisition. Applying the unique resources filter and toggling the 
links for each resource list provides the views shown in Figures 39, 40, and 41 
respectively. 
Examination of the socket list with links does not seem to display any unique 
patterns or trends visually. The port list with links shows one active connection to a 
process named IEXPLORE.EXE. 
If method 2 is applied, this dataset should be compared to a similar trusted image. 
Since a process named IEXPLORE.EXE is listed it is compared to the trusted IE dataset 
from the previous section. 
A few observations can be made: 
 The single connection to IEXPLORE.EXE in the malware dataset differs from 
the numerous connections seen in the trusted dataset (see Figures 24, 25). 
 The iexplore.exe loaded module that appears in the trusted dataset appears 
differently in the Malware 2 set as IEXPLORE.EXE (see Figure 26). 
Using these observations it can be deduced that the malware in this dataset is probably 
masquerading as an instance of IE. In Section 3.3.2, the Poison Ivy Remote 
Administration Tool (RAT) is discussed as a form of malware. A key behavior of Poison 
Ivy is its ability to inject itself into a browser process. Considering the single connection 
to this process we can classify this as a potential RAT signature. 
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Figure 39. Malware 2 – Socket List Links. 
I WinXP Malware 2 • I I FetchData I I Initia lize Data I I System View I I Apply Resource Filter I I Toggle links I 
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Figure 40. Malware 2 – Port List Links. 
I WinXP Malware 2 • I I Fetch Data I I Init ialize Data I I System View I I Apply Resource Filter I I Toggle Links I 
Port 1314 
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Figure 41. Malware 2 – Loaded Modules (.exe) Links.
Explorer.EXE 
GoogleUpdate.ex e 
alg.ex e 
cmd.ex e 
csrss.ex e 
ctfmon.ex e 
lsass.ex e 
msmsgs .ex e 
rundll32.ex e 
[ WinXP Malware 2 • [ I Fetch Data I [ Initialize Data I System View I I Apply Resource Filter I I Toggle Links I 
w scntfy.exe 
w inlogon.ex e 
w in32d d-.ex e 
vmtoolsd.exe 
vrnacthlp.ex e 
svchost.exe 
spoolsv.ex e 
smss.ex e 
services.ex e 
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4.3.8 Windows XP SP3 (Malware 3) 
The final forensic memory image also contains malware operating on the system 
at the time of memory acquisition. Filtering for unique resources and toggling the links 
for each resource list provides the views shown in Figures 42, 43, and 44. 
Examination of the socket list visualization with links does not seem to display 
any unique patterns or trends. It does bear a close resemblance to the socket layout from 
the Malware 2 dataset (see Figure 39). The ports list, however, shows only one 
connection which is attached to an msmsgs.exe process node. The MSMSGS.EXE process 
appears in multiple datasets and appears to be a legitimate process but does not have any 
connections in any of the trusted samples (see Figure 45 from trusted Solitaire dataset). 
This observation coupled with the single connection reveals a pattern that can be treated 
as a possible instance of RAT malware similar to the Malware 2 dataset
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Figure 42. Malware 3 – Socket List Links. 
l WinXP Malware 3 • l I FetchData I I Initialize Data I System View I I Apply Resource Filter I I Toggle Links I 
socket:[G) socket:[SGG) 
socket:[1 G28) socket:[450G) 
socket:[1 G34) socket:[445) 
socket:[123) socket:[190G) 
socket:[135) socket:[139) 
socket:[137) socket:[138) 
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Figure 43. Malware 3 – Port List Links. 
I WinXP Malware 3 • I I Fetch Data I I Initialize Data I I System View I I Apply Resource Filter I I Toggle Links I 
PROCESS 
MSMSGS.EXE 
Port 1034 
 
78 
 
Figure 44. Malware 3 – Loaded Modules (.exe) Links. 
I WinXP Malware 3 T I I FetchData I I Initialize Data I I System View I I Apply Resource Filter I I Toggle Links I 
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Figure 45. Solitaire – MSMSGS.EXE process highlighted.
I WinXP Solitaire • I I FetchData I I Initialize Data I I System View I I Apply Resource Filter I I Toggle links I 
I No Open Sockets I Files 
PROCESS 
0 
MSMSGS.EXE 
No Open Ports Keys 
No Running Services Loaded Modules 
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4.4 Summary 
This chapter applies the D3 JavaScript Visualization tool to various test datasets 
extracted from a number of Windows XP memory dumps. The results from the eight 
sample datasets are evaluated against the three research goals outlined in Chapter 1. The 
first objective requires the developed visualization tool provide a global view of the data 
that is extracted from forensic memory dumps using memory analysis tools. The second 
goal expects the tool to possess the ability to filter datasets and highlight two key 
relationships within the data. The first is the relationship between a process and its 
associated resources, while the second is the relationship between a particular resource 
and its corresponding process nodes. The final objective of the research requires the 
visualization tool contain features that assist the user in locating behavior patterns and 
unique items of relevance within the datasets. 
 Five of the Windows memory captures contain legitimate (trusted) process 
activity while three datasets contain malware. Evaluation of the trusted datasets provides 
profiles of legitimate process activity that can be compared against malware datasets. By 
applying the features of the visualization tool, FUTo malware activity is located in the 
Malware 1 dataset while instances of the Poison Ivy Remote Administration Tool are 
detected in both the Malware 2 and Malware 3 datasets.  
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
 The proof-of-concept visualization tool developed in this research is shown to 
provide a level of assistance to forensic investigators in the discovery of new data and 
existing patterns. The specific objectives for this research outlined in Chapter 1 are as 
follows: 
1. The visualization tool should provide an interactive global view of the data 
output from forensic memory image analysis tools. 
2. The visualization tool should have the ability to filter the datasets for a 
particular system and visually represent the following associations: 
 The relationship between each process and its associated resources. 
 The relationship between a system resource and its associated 
processes. 
3. The visualization tool should assist the user in locating unique patterns and 
information of relevance within the datasets. 
By addressing the overall problem statement and meeting the research objectives listed 
above, it can be implied that the thesis research is successful. 
5.1 Research Accomplishments 
 This research obtained forensic memory images from Windows XP machines and 
developed an interactive software tool that graphically represents the extracted datasets 
using Information Visualization techniques. Multiple systems containing forms of 
malware were analyzed using the developed visualization tool to discover specific 
behavior patterns and attempt to identify the type of malware. The visualization tool 
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created using D3 JavaScript is capable of running on virtually any platform due to its 
web-based design making it completely portable for use in the field. 
5.2 Future Work 
 One shortcoming of the visualization tool developed in this research is its 
limitation to a single data input format. The JavaScript source code for this project is 
specifically tailored to import data files that are in a particular format (CSV). One web 
blog describes a method of using an SQL database to generate datasets based on queries 
(D3noob, 2013). Streamlining both the collection and digital artifact extraction processes 
into one automated routine would improve the overall usability and increase the speed of 
analysis. 
 One potential method of improving the visualization and location of items of 
interest in large datasets could involve the whitelisting of trusted processes and resources. 
Placing less emphasis on trusted objects may help digital forensic analysts focus on the 
important data contained in a particular collection. 
 A useful addition to the visualization tool would involve the automatic detection 
of hidden processes similar to the FUTo and RAT malware discovered in Chapter 4. By 
understanding the behavior of certain process hiding mechanisms, the tool could filter 
and search the data to identify such cases and highlight the responsible process nodes and 
resources respectively. 
 While the eight datasets tested in this research utilize the Window XP operating 
system, the visualization tool can also be applied to datasets from Windows 7 forensic 
memory images as shown in Figure 46. CMAT is used to perform the extraction of digital 
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artifacts from the dump due to the limited number of Volatility plugin modules currently 
compatible with Windows 7 architecture. 
The digital forensic visualization methods used in this research can also be ported 
to various operating systems including Mac OS X, Linux, and Android.  A prototype 
model for an Android 4.3 memory dump was developed during the course of this 
research but includes a limited feature set. Figure 47 contains a screen capture of the 
Android process node layout. Since both Android and Linux are fairly similar in 
architecture, it would appear fairly simple to modify the system to accept datasets from 
both operating systems. 
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Figure 46. Windows 7 Dataset Visualization. 
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Figure 47. Android 4.3 Dataset Visualization (Prototype).
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